Traducción en Versión Beta
CALL FOR PAPERS for a topical issue of Open Philosophy HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION Open Philosophy (https://www.degruyterbrill.com/journal/key/opphil/html) invites submissions for the topical issue "Hegel's Philosophy…
The topic of this issue is Hegel’s account of action.
To act typically means to realize one’s goals through the exercise of one’s intention—that is, to act on reasons that justify one’s action as true and good. If one fails to act, one’s reasons appear to have been obstructed: either by external circumstances, such as unfavourable conditions, or by a kind of inertia of intelligence—the additional judgement required of the agent to translate an intention into concrete action.
On this view, action is understood as a predicate of ability: the power to act is conceived independently of the actual conditions of its exercise. Whether an action is realized then becomes secondary, since the validity of the agent’s reasons is not empirically verifiable. In other words, if action is understood as mere potentiality—prior to entering into relations with the empirical world—its effects on others, and others’ judgements of it, become irrelevant. The agent retains the authority to insist that, regardless of what one actually does, one’s intention remains perfectly valid.
Hegel criticizes this model.
In acting from an intention, the agent may turn out to be mistaken. Even when one’s reasons are sound, the outcome may still be wrong. Helping others, for example, may be a valid principle, while its concrete application may be flawed if those whom one intends to help are in fact hindered or harmed by one’s actions.
Knowing that an action conforms to an ability (potentia) is therefore never sufficient to rule out the possibility that something about it is wrong in the particular situation. That possibility could be excluded only if the content of the action were realized in its concrete exercise—a notion that undermines the very idea of ability understood independently of its actualization.
Hegel therefore insists that action cannot be separated from one’s concrete doing. In Hegel’s terms, the actuality of purpose is the purpose of acting. Because the consequences of an action participate in its causality, every action is, by its very concept, incongruent with the agent’s prior intention. Hegel’s prominent critique of moral action—of action that focuses solely on intentions and thereby comes into conflict with its consequences when it enters the actual forms of social and political life—is closely connected with this structure.
If no action can be separated from its actual consequences, what distinguishes a successful action from a failed one? If action is mediated by an incongruence between intention and outcome, what does this imply for the “truth” of the process of action as a whole?
What, from this perspective, is a “wrong” action, and what is a “true” action? How are the two related within the process of action? Moreover, if action can be validated neither by intention alone nor by its outcome, but both can be understood only through the process as a whole, how should we interpret the ethics of Hegel’s philosophy of action? Both straightforwardly deontological and utilitarian or pragmatist interpretations appear inadequate.
This topical issue aims to explore these questions and a nexus of related themes—including virtuous action, political action, and historical action—from a variety of perspectives. They converge on a central conceptual tension:
For Hegel, action resides in one’s concrete doing: there is no action apart from what one actually does. In this sense, action cannot be validated by intention alone. Yet this does not mean that its validity depends simply on its consequences. Rather, both intention and outcome must be understood in light of the knowledge disclosed through action itself.
While Hegel’s understanding of action has attracted growing attention in recent scholarship, this aspect of his thought remains comparatively overlooked and underdeveloped. From the Phenomenology of Spirit, through the Science of Logic, to the Philosophy of Right and the Philosophy of History, the problem bears directly on Hegel’s practical philosophy as a whole.
We particularly welcome contributions addressing questions such as:
Submission period: September 1–30, 2026 Article length: No specific length limitations
Manuscripts should be submitted through the Open Philosophy online submission system:
When submitting, please select the article type:
Hegel’s Philosophy of Action
Before submission, authors should carefully consult the journal’s Instructions for Authors.
All contributions will undergo critical peer review before being accepted for publication.
Questions concerning the topical issue may be addressed to:
Bojana Jovićević University of Ljubljana bojana.jovicevic@ff.uni-lj.si
Gregor Schäfer University of Basel / University of London gregor.schaefer@unibas.ch
For technical problems with the submission system, please contact:
Open Philosophy is published under an Open Access model. As a rule, publication costs are covered through Article Publishing Charges (APCs) paid by authors, their affiliated institutions, funders, or sponsors.
Authors without access to publishing funds are encouraged to discuss possible discounts or waivers with OA Portfolio Manager Magdalena Skoneczna before submitting their manuscripts: